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    Leading financial economists have 
proposed the use of international asset 
swaps (Merton 1990, Bodie and Merton 
2002) as a way of efficiently achieving 
international diversification without 
eroding the level of foreign exchange 
reserves and weakening local market 
development. 
    International asset swaps entail 
limited foreign currency flows (only net 
gains or losses need to be exchanged). 
They protect foreign investors from 
market manipulation and expropriation 
risk and have much lower transaction 
costs than outright investments. 
    But asset swaps are constrained by the 
attractiveness of local markets to foreign 
investors, and by various regulatory 
issues covering counterparty risk and 
collateral considerations, and 
accounting, valuation, and reporting 
rules. 
    Institutional investors are well 
developed in South Africa. Their total 
assets corresponded in 2001 to 159 
percent of GDP, a level that was 
surpassed by only four high-income 
countries. But because of the imposition 
of exchange controls, they lacked 
international diversification. In July 
1995 South Africa was the first 
developing country that explicitly 
allowed its pension funds and other 
institutional investors to make use of 
“asset swap.” 
    But the South African authorities did 
not authorize use of properly specified 
swap contracts as described by Bodie 
and Merton, but rather permitted 
institutional investors to “obtain foreign 
investments by way of swap 
arrangements.” 
    As Vittas argues in this paper, the 
asset swap mechanism turned out to be 
cumbersome and inefficient. However, it 
did allow institutional investors to attain 
some level of international 
diversification.  
    Other developing countries should 
consider authorizing their institutional 
investors to engage in international asset 
swaps. But they should authorize the use 
of properly designed swap contracts, 
preferably based on baskets of liquid 
securities, permit only global investment 
banks to act as counterparties, require 
use of global custodians, properly 
monitor credit risk, maintain adequate 
collateral, and adopt market-to-market 
valuation rules. 
    Asset swaps are clearly a second-best 
option compared to the lifting of 
exchange controls. However, they may 
facilitate risk diversification in the 
presence of such controls. And they may 
even have a role to play in their absence.  
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I. Introduction 
Institutional investors, and especially pension funds and life insurance companies, 
are becoming major participants in the financial systems of a growing number of 
developing countries. In some cases, like Egypt, Malaysia or Sri Lanka, the sector is 
dominated by public agencies, but in several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Cyprus, Hungary, Mauritius, and especially South Africa, private institutions play 
a prominent role in the accumulation of long-term financial resources. But in most 
developing countries, pension funds and other institutional investors operate under strict 
limitations on their foreign investments, mainly because of the shortage of foreign 
exchange reserves and the fear of capital flight as well as concerns about stimulating the 
development of local capital markets and the local economy in general.  As a result, they 
are not allowed to diversify their country risk and build an adequate level of international 
diversification. 
The use of international asset swaps has been proposed by leading financial 
economists (Merton 1990, Bodie and Merton 2002) as a way of efficiently achieving 
international diversification without eroding the level of foreign exchange reserves and 
weakening capital market development. In July 1995, South Africa was the first 
developing country that explicitly allowed its pension funds and other institutional 
investors to make use of asset swaps. However, the South African authorities did not 
authorize use of properly specified swap contracts as described by Bodie and Merton, but 
rather permitted institutional investors to “obtain foreign investments by way of swap 
arrangements” (hence, the presence of inverted commas in the title). This paper examines 
the use of these facilities. It discusses the operating modalities of the arrangements, the 
extent to which they met their objectives, the accounting and regulatory issues they 
raised, and the policy implications for other developing countries.    
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, sections II 
reviews briefly the barriers to foreign investments. Section III offers a brief anatomy of 
international asset swaps, while section IV discusses their main benefits. Then, section V 
offers a detailed examination of the use of swap arrangements in South Africa, with an 
evaluation of the extent to which these facilities deviated from proper swap contracts.   2
Section VI concludes with an evaluation of policy implications for other developing 
countries. Sections V and VI pay special attention to accounting, regulatory and 
supervision issues. Two annexes provide some useful background information. The first 
covers the growth and structure of institutional investors in South Africa and the second 
reviews their asset allocation policies and the impact of evolving government policies on 
them. 
II.  Barriers to Foreign Investments 
The imposition of exchange controls on investment in foreign assets affects the 
financial performance of pension funds and insurance companies.  Such controls have an 
effect similar to that of prescribed investments in that they force contractual savings 
institutions to invest all their resources in domestic assets.  Their rate of return may suffer 
if there are fewer investment opportunities in the local market.  Exchange controls 
prevent an international diversification of risk and a reduction in the exposure of 
contractual savings institutions to domestic currency and market risk. 
Pension funds and other institutional investors in most developing countries are 
not generally allowed to invest overseas. Even OECD countries until the early 1980s used 
to apply tight quantitative restrictions on overseas investments by local institutions.
1 The 
most common rationale for such restrictions is to reduce the risk of capital “flight”, 
especially institutionalized capital flight. Another rationale is that locally mobilized long-
term savings, generated from contributions and premiums paid by or on behalf of local 
workers, should be invested “at home” to stimulate the development of local capital 
markets and enhance employment opportunities for those same workers rather than 
workers elsewhere. In some countries, restrictions on foreign assets had been justified on 
prudential grounds (since less was generally known about foreign assets) but 
globalization and the strengthening of financial regulation and supervision have 
weakened substantially the relevance of this factor (except for the expropriation threat). 
Even in the absence of legal limitations on foreign investing by local institutional 
investors, there are other significant barriers.  Among the most important are the risk of 
                                                 
1 For a list of restrictions imposed by governments in OECD member countries, see OECD (2000).    3
expropriation by foreign governments (including heavier taxes imposed on foreign 
investors) and transaction costs.  These costs can be so large that they may offset any 
diversification benefits that would otherwise accrue, especially when relatively low 
volumes of funds are involved.  
International diversification improves the risk/return tradeoff of investment 
portfolios by reducing the exposure to cyclical and long-term structural shifts in local 
economic performance and by allowing participation in dynamic industries or regions in 
other parts of the world.  International evidence shows that while the average rate of 
return may not increase as a result of international diversification, the average risk, 
measured by the volatility of returns, is substantially reduced (Davis 1993).  International 
diversification is more important for smaller countries where the benefits of diversifying 
away from a small number of liquid securities are greatest. 
In the 1970s, pension fund investments in foreign assets were very small, even in 
those few countries that did not impose exchange controls on overseas investments or 
strict limits on foreign assets of pension funds.  But following the general relaxation of 
exchange controls in the 1980s and the growing globalization of capital markets, the 
share of foreign assets in pension fund portfolios increased considerably in a number of 
countries. In some countries, e.g. Hong Kong, overseas assets account for two-thirds of 
the total assets of pension funds. In most OECD countries, foreign investments have 
gradually grown over time and now represent between 25% and 30% of assets. In the US, 
where the large local economy is highly diversified and where presence of global 
corporations provide an indirect avenue of international diversification, overseas assets 
are less than 12% of total assets, although this still represents a significant increase over 
time. A similar indirect diversification is offered to Swiss pension funds by the large 
multinational Swiss companies (Queisser and Vittas 2000). 
Removing exchange controls and fully integrating with international capital 
markets should be the ultimate objective of policy in all developing countries.  However, 
complete removal of exchange controls is often constrained by the paucity of foreign 
exchange reserves and the fear of stimulating capital flight, especially if confidence in 
future stability is low.  An alternative to complete and immediate removal of exchange   4
controls would be to authorize asset swaps between domestic and foreign institutional 
investors, especially pension funds.  This would allow risk diversification while averting 
a capital flight.  Another option would be to maintain exchange controls for general 
purposes, but permit contractual savings institutions to embark on a slow and gradual 
increase in their holdings of foreign securities. A third option would be to combine these 
two measures, i.e. allow a small amount of foreign investments as well as limited use of 
asset swaps.  
III.  Anatomy of International Assets Swaps 
The basic mechanics of international asset swaps are easy to present.
2  Pension 
funds that already own domestic equities engage in a swap with a global pension 
intermediary, probably an investment bank with operations in London, New York, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, or other international financial center.  The international swap 
counterparts must have very high credit ratings, or alternatively the swaps must be 
guaranteed by third parties with strong credit ratings, otherwise they would result in risk 
substitution rather than risk diversification. 
In an equity swap, the total return per dollar on the domestic stock market is 
exchanged annually for the total return per dollar on a market-value weighted-average of 
the world stock markets.  Equity swaps effectively transfer the risk of the domestic stock 
market to foreign investors and provide the local pension funds with the risk-return 
pattern of a well-diversified world portfolio.  Since there are no initial payments between 
parties, there are no initial capital flows in or out of the country.  Subsequent payments, 
which may be either inflows or outflows, involve only the difference between the returns 
on the two stock market indices. No principal amounts flow across the exchanges from 
the swap arrangements. 
For example, on a notional or principal amount of $1 billion, if, ex post, the world 
stock market earns 10 percent and the domestic market earns 12 percent, there is only a 
flow of (.12 - .10) x $1 billion or $20 million out of the country.  Furthermore, the local 
investors make net payments overseas precisely when they and their country can “best” 
                                                 
2  This and the following section draw extensively on Bodie and Merton (2002).   5
afford it: namely, when the domestic market has outperformed the world markets.  In 
those years in which the domestic market underperforms the world stock markets, the 
swap generates net cash flows into the country to the domestic investors.  Hence, in this 
example, if the domestic market earns 8 percent and the world stock market earns 11 
percent, then domestic investors receive (.11 - .08) x $1 billion = $30 million, a net cash 
inflow when local conditions are poor and foreign currency inflows may be highly 
desirable. 
Equity swaps enable pension funds to achieve broader international 
diversification.  A different type of swap could enable them to hedge equity risk 
altogether.  This would be particularly important for people in countries where there is no 
local entity, including the government, capable of issuing fixed-income securities that are 
free of all risk.  This second type of swap would call for the pension fund to swap the 
total return on its equity portfolio for a risk-free interest rate denominated in a “strong” 
currency or in units of constant purchasing power.  This type of swap would work the 
same way as an equity swap, except that the net cash flows produced by the swap would 
result in the pension fund receiving a risk-free rate of return.  The counterparty must have 
a very good credit rating, or the swap must be guaranteed by a third party with a strong 
credit rating.   The local pension funds would have to make payments to the swap 
counterparty only in years when the local market outperforms the risk-free rate. 
A third possibility is to swap the income stream from holdings of domestic bonds 
for the interest income (fixed or floating) of foreign bonds. Again local swap counterparts 
only make payments when the local bond market outperforms the international bond 
market. 
IV.  Benefits of International Assets Swaps 
The general case for the use of international asset swaps by pension funds and 
other institutional investors has been strongly made by Merton (1990) and Bodie and 
Merton (2002).  
The main benefits come from a significant improvement in the efficient frontier of 
risk versus expected return.  The global equity markets can be used to achieve better   6
diversification and the global fixed-income markets can be used to achieve better hedging 
opportunities.
3 This latter would be particularly important for people in countries where 
there is no local entity, including the government, capable of issuing fixed-income 
securities that are free of risk. Swapping the income stream from holdings of domestic 
bonds for the interest income (fixed or floating) of foreign bonds would be particularly 
attractive for countries that in addition to prohibiting their own institutional investors 
from investing overseas do not also allow foreign institutions to invest in the local bond 
market. The same benefits in terms of risk diversification and ease of transaction would 
accrue for both domestic and international portfolio investors interested in investments in 
the originating country. 
As already mentioned, asset swaps have a limited effect on capital flows as no 
principal amounts are exchanged. Furthermore, local pension funds would have to make 
payments to the swap counterparty only in years when the local market outperforms the 
international markets and income generation in the local economy is high. Asset swaps of 
a long tenor could also provide some shield to the financial markets of developing 
countries from sudden adverse developments in the financial markets of major OECD 
countries. Asset swaps could offer some protection from sudden outflows of capital that 
could be triggered by the high volatility of sentiment among international fund managers 
and their susceptibility to herding behavior. This would be another reason favoring 
significant use of asset swaps even in a world that is free of foreign investment controls. 
Asset swaps (equity as well as bond) may also be attractive to international 
portfolio investors if cross-border transactions in the underlying securities suffer from 
technical inefficiencies (e.g., no participation in international clearing arrangements or no 
possibility of transacting in book entry form
4.) Moreover, asset swaps can also mitigate 
the other barriers to investing abroad — expropriation risk and high transaction costs.   
                                                 
3  Following the terminology of Bodie and Merton, diversification is used to mean an allocation of the 
portfolio among many risky assets, while hedging is used to mean eliminating risk by taking an offsetting 
position in another asset.  In this terminology, substituting a risk-free asset for risky assets in the portfolio 
is hedging. 
4   The use of interest rate swaps by foreign investors has recently grown in Iceland in connection with 
demand for housing bonds that pay inflation linked interest rates. Because Icelandic housing bonds are not 
registered with international clearing agencies (Asgeirsson 2002,),  foreign investors prefer to enter into 
interest rate swaps with Icelandic institutions. The latter invest in indexed housing bonds which they then   7
With swap contracts, trading and ownership of actual shares remain with domestic 
investors
5. By implication, the accounting and regulatory treatment remains a domestic 
issue. Foreign investors also benefit from the swap contract by avoiding the costs of 
trading in individual assets in the local markets and – for equity swaps – by not having 
the problems of corporate control issues that arise when foreigners acquire large 
ownership positions in domestic companies.  Unlike standard cash investments in equities 
or debt, the default or expropriation exposure of foreign investors is limited to the 
difference in returns instead of the total gross return plus principal (in the above example, 
$20 million versus $1.02 billion). 
The potential exposure of foreign investors to manipulation by local investors is 
also probably less for the swap contract than for direct transactions in individual stocks.  
It is more difficult to manipulate a broad market index than the price of a single stock.  
Even if settlement intervals for swaps are standardized at six months or one year, the 
calendar settlement dates may differ for each swap, depending upon the date of its 
initiation.  Hence, with some swaps being settled every day, manipulators would have to 
keep the prices of shares permanently low to succeed.   
Furthermore, with the settlement terms of swaps based on the per-period rate of 
return, an artificially low price (and low rate of return) for settlement this year will induce 
an artificially high rate of return for settlement next year.  Thus, gains from manipulation 
in the first period are given back in the second, unless the price can be kept low over the 
entire life of the swap. Since typical swap contract maturities range from two to ten years 
(with semi-annual or annual settlements), this would be difficult to achieve. 
Bodie and Merton show that international asset swaps can be used effectively and 
at reasonable cost to achieve the goal of improved international risk-sharing without 
violating restrictions on capital outflows to other countries.  However, the practical 
availability of international asset swaps to institutional investors in developing countries 
                                                                                                                                                 
pledge as collateral security for repo loans from the central bank. Foreign investors pay the interest on the 
repo and earn the yield on the indexed bonds (Central Bank of Iceland 2003).  
5   It is assumed in this discussion that pension funds and other institutional investors are only allowed to 
“swap” securities that they already hold. However, the swap market does not necessarily require that 
institutional investors hold the underlying securities. Trading “notional” values would achieve the same 
result.    8
heavily depends on the attractiveness, or investability, of the local markets for foreign 
investors. A forthcoming study by Ladekarl and Zervos (2003) draws attention to the 
investability criteria used by international investors. The study finds that good 
housekeeping and plumbing, implying sound macroeconomic policies, adequate data 
availability and transparency, and effective basic regulation and supervision, are 
prominent among the investability criteria used by global investment institutions. 
Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) also find that foreign institutional investors 
consider such country criteria as total market capitalization and returns as well as investor 
protection and legal enforcement.  These findings imply that in developing countries that 
do not meet basic criteria of investability, domestic institutional investors may have to 
pay a significant premium to foreign investors in order to be able to conclude effective 
swap contracts. A very high premium would discourage local pension funds from 
engaging in this type of activity. 
The use of international asset swaps also raises important questions that relate to 
accounting and regulatory issues, counterparty risk, and custodial and settlement 
arrangements. These aspects are discussed in sections V and VI after the presentation of 
the South African experience. 
V.  The Use of “Asset Swaps” in South Africa 
Institutional investors, and especially the contractual savings sector, are very well 
developed in South Africa. The net assets of retirement funds and long-term insurers, 
after eliminating double counting, amounted in 2001 to ZAR 1.39 trillion or 142% of 
GDP (See Annex I). This was up from 119% of GDP in 1995. Adding the assets of unit 
trusts brings the total for institutional investors to ZAR 1.56 trillion in 2001, equivalent to 
159% of GDP.
6 Only four other countries in the world (the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) have institutional investors that have more assets 
in relation to GDP than South Africa. The net flow into contractual savings (pension 
funds and long-term insurers), taking into account contributions and premiums as well as 
                                                 
6   Short-term insurers are not classified as institutional investors in South Africa. Their assets amounted to 
4.6% of GDP in 2001.    9
investment income and after allowing for benefit outlays, administrative expenses and tax 
payments, amounted to an impressive 18% of GDP in 2001. 
The asset allocation policies of institutional investors have been shaped by the use 
of prescribed asset ratios that favored public sector securities (before 1989) and by the 
imposition of exchange controls that prevented investments in overseas assets (Annex II). 
Insurance companies and pension funds were required until 1989 to place 53% of their 
untaxed liabilities and 33% of their taxed liabilities into fixed-interest-bearing public 
sector securities.  The real return on those securities was substantially lower than that on 
listed equities.  Although it was positive in real terms in the 1960s, it turned negative in 
the 1970s and 1980s when inflation accelerated to double digits. The foregone income 
loss on prescribed securities reached 6.1% in the 1960s, 16% in the 1970s and 5.8% in 
the 1980s. Taking  into account their asset allocations, the investment return of long-term 
insurers was lower by 4.5 percentage points in the 1970s and 1.7 percentage points in the 
1980s. The corresponding figures for pension funds were 7.8 and 2.6 percentage points, 
respectively (Annex II). 
Prescribed ratios were abolished in 1989 and institutional investors proceeded to 
adjust their portfolios. By 1995, public sector claims represented 28% of total assets and 
equities 46%. Long-term insurers invested more in equities (56%) than self-administered 
private and official pension funds (30% and 12% respectively). However, foreign 
investments were still prohibited.    
The South African authorities have long been aware of the lack of international 
diversification of the assets of local institutional investors and their exposure to the 
domestic equity market. The latter had increased considerably during the period of 
sanctions and divestment of foreign companies from South Africa (see Annex I).  In 
March 1995, at the time of the abolition of the financial rand
7, the budget statement 
alluded to the demand for foreign assets by various types of institutional investors to 
enable them to achieve a wider spread of their risks.  
Chronology.  In July 1995, in order to assist long-term insurance companies, 
pension funds and unit trusts in achieving this goal, the authorities decided to allow such 
                                                 
7   A specialized market in which holdings of foreign securities by SA residents were traded.   10
institutions to invest a portion of their assets abroad. However, taking into account the 
low level of foreign exchange reserves at the time, the authorities decided against 
permitting outright purchases of foreign currency for foreign investment purposes. 
Instead, they decided to allow institutional investors to “obtain foreign investments by 
way of swap arrangements”. These arrangements were required to provide for the actual 
exchange with foreign investors of part of their existing asset portfolios for foreign assets 
rather than for the traditional swap contracts described above. Special emphasis was 
placed on measures to safeguard the foreign exchange reserves against the subsequent 
withdrawal from South Africa of the reciprocal non-resident investments. The facility 
was seen as a further step in the process of gradually easing exchange controls (see Table 
1 for a chronological summary of exchange control circulars).   
A limit of 5% of total assets was initially applied. This was increased to 10% in 
June 1996. At that time, a limit for outright investments overseas was also introduced. 
This was equal to 3% of the net inflow during calendar 1995, but subject to an overall 
limit of 10% of total assets. In March 1997, an additional limit of 2% of the preceding 
calendar year’s net inflow was introduced for investments in securities listed on 
registered stock exchanges in SADC member countries, bringing the total limit for 
outright foreign investments to 5% of the net inflow.  However, the total overall limit was 
kept unchanged at 10% of total assets. A clear definition of the net inflow of each type of 
institution was also provided (Table 2). For unit trusts, the relevant entity was changed to 
the unit trust management company and its total assets under management in South 
Africa. In July 1997, registered fund managers were authorized to use the asset swap 
mechanism but were not granted the cash flow dispensation. 
In March 1998, the overall limit of foreign assets by way of swaps was raised to 
15% of total assets, while the limit of outright foreign investments was increased to 5% 
of the preceding calendar year net inflow and that for investments in SADC countries to 
an additional 10% of the net inflow. In February 2000, the limit of 15% of the total assets 
of long-term insurers, pension funds and fund managers was unchanged but that for unit 
trusts was raised to 20%. In addition, the limit of outright foreign investments was raised 
to 10% of the preceding calendar year net inflow, with no separate limit for investments 
in SADC countries.  11
 
Table 1: Summary of Exchange Control Circulars 
1995 07 14  New facility was introduced permitting institutional investors to obtain foreign 
investments by way of swap arrangements. Decision noted negligible country risk 
diversification of institutional investor assets of R500 billion as well as low level of 
foreign exchange reserves of R12.5 billion, hence the attractiveness of the asset swap 
mechanism. Authorization of individual transactions was required, based on 
application and approval, up to 5% of total assets. Mention was made of possible 
future allocation for outright foreign investments and reference to gradual easing of 
exchange control. 
1996 06 21  Limit on investment in foreign assets by way of asset swaps was raised from 5 to 10% 
of total assets. Limit for outright foreign investments was introduced.  This was set at 3 
percent of net inflow during calendar 1995, but subject to overall limit of 10% of total 
assets. 
1997 03 13  Limits of 10% of total assets for asset swaps and 3% of the net inflow during calendar 
1996 for outright investments were renewed. Additional limit of 2% of net 1996 
inflow was introduced for outright investments on registered stock exchanges in 
SADC member countries. The total overall limit was kept unchanged at 10% of total 
assets. Clear definition of net inflow was provided for each type of institutional 
investor. Also, for unit trusts, the relevant entity was changed to the unit trust 
management company and its total assets under management in South Africa.   
1997 07 01  Definition of qualifying institutions for the asset swaps mechanism was broadened to 
include all registered fund managers offering private client asset management services. 
1997 07 22  It was clarified that only asset swap transactions that did not involve a flow of funds 
would be permitted. Future transactions should be structured on the basis of an 
exchange of cash and/or a portfolio of assets. 
1998 03 11  The overall limit of foreign assets by way of swaps was raised to 15% of total assets. 
The limit of outright foreign investments for long-term insurers, pension funds and 
unit trust management companies was raised to 5% of the net inflow during calendar 
1997 while the limit of outright investments on registered stock exchanges in SADC 
countries was raised to 10% of net calendar 1997 inflow. Both flow limits were subject 
to the overall 15% asset limit. 
1999 02 23  Dispensation and limits were renewed without change. Reference was made to 
applications for foreign asset swaps of R130 billion approved and R60 billion 
transacted up to the end of 1998. 
2000 02 23  Limit of 15% of total assets was renewed for long-term insurance companies, pension 
funds and fund managers. It was raised to 20% for unit trust management companies. 
The definition of assets was broadened from total assets employed in South Africa to 
total assets. The limit of outright investments for long-term insurers, pension funds and 
unit trust management companies was raised to 10% of net calendar 1999 inflow, with 
no separate limit for investments in SADC countries, but subject to the respective asset 
limits.  
2001 02 21  Reference was made to total foreign assets acquired under the asset swap mechanism 
amounting to R100 billion. However, the asset swap mechanism for new transactions 
was terminated. Total foreign assets were retained at 15% of total assets for long-term 
insurers, pension funds and fund managers and 20% for unit trust management 
companies.  New foreign investments by log-term insurers, pension funds and unit 
trust management companies were, however, limited to 10% of the net calendar 2000 
inflow, subject to the overall asset limits. 
2001 11 13  The cash flow dispensation was extended to registered fund managers, who were 
authorized  to make new foreign investments up to 10% of their net calendar 2000 
inflow, subject to the 15% asset limit.  
   12




Differences in the nature of the business of the various categories of institutional investors prevent the 
formulation of a unique definition of the net flow of funds to these institutions. Separate definitions for 
each of the three broad categories are therefore required. 
 
For long-term insurers, the most accurate indication of their net inflow of funds is given by the concept  
“domestic current income surplus". The definition is as follows: 
Domestic current income surplus   = 
Local current receipts, consisting of   
Investment income   
Premiums received (net of reinsurance locally and abroad)   
         Pension and group life business   
         Retirement annuities   
         Other insurance business 
less  
Current expenditure, consisting of 
       Claims paid 
             Lump sum at retirement 
             Lump sum at death or other payments 
Annuities 
Surrenders (pension funds and other life business) 




For pension and provident funds, the most accurate indication of their net inflow of funds is given by the 
concept “ domestic current income surplus ". The definition is as follows: 
Domestic current income surplus = 
Local current receipts, consisting of   
Investment income   
          Interest and dividends   
          Rent  
Contributions by 
            Members and 
            Employers, including actuarial deficit reduction contributions 
less  
Current expenditure, consisting of 
           Benefits 
                 Lump sum at retirement or death 
                 Other lump sum payments 
                 Annuities 
           Administrative expenses 
 
For unit trusts, the most accurate indication of their net inflow of funds is given by the concept “ value of 
net sales of units”  The definition is as follows. 
Value of net sales of units   = 
Gross sales valued at repurchase prices 
less  
Repurchases at actual transaction value.   13
Finally, in February 2001, the asset swap mechanism was terminated but the limit 
on total foreign assets was retained at 15% of total assets for long-term insurers, pension 
funds and fund managers and 20% for unit trusts. New foreign investments were, 
however, still limited to 10% of the preceding calendar year net inflow. In November 
2001, the cash flow dispensation was extended to registered fund managers, who were 
also authorized to make new foreign investments up to 10% of their net calendar 2000 
inflow, subject to the 15% asset limit. 
Institutional investors utilized the swap facilities to achieve some international 
diversification of their assets. The SARB indicated that ZAR 60 billion of asset swaps 
had been effected by February 1999 and the total reached ZAR 100 billion in February 
2001. However, the foreign assets acquired through swap arrangements or outright have 
not been separately identified in the statistics published by SARB. For insurance 
companies, foreign assets are shown with other assets, while for pension funds, they are 
included with domestic equities or bonds, as the case may be. Data for long-term insurers 
show that between 1995 and 2001, other assets grew from 3.7% to 17.1% of assets.
8 In 
general, market practitioners claim that institutional investors made full use of the 
permitted 15% limit by 2001.      
The South African experience underscores the benefits of a gradual approach. In 
fact, both of the intermediate solutions mentioned in section II above were used. The 
authorities allowed limited use of asset swaps and permitted small but gradually 
increasing amounts of outright foreign investments as special limits for institutional 
investors. In this way, significant risk diversification was achieved, while averting a 
capital flight.  
However, several questions arise with regard to the South African experience. 
How did the asset swap mechanism work? Who were the counterparties? What were the 
costs? How was settlement effected? What was the treatment of local equities that were 
also listed in overseas markets? Were there any collateral requirements and how was 
                                                 
8   As already noted, short-term insurers are not classified as institutional investors in South Africa and did 
not qualify for use of the asset swap mechanism. Their other assets also grew from 9.4% to 15.4% of their 
total assets between 1995 and 2001 but this must have been caused by other developments and not by 
acquisition of foreign assets.   14
collateral arranged? And, last but by no means least, what were the regulatory, 
accounting and reporting requirements? 
Asset Swap Mechanism. Prior to entering into an asset swap transaction, 
approval had to be obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (“SARB”).  Once 
approval was granted, the South African investor was able to source a foreign 
counterparty that was willing to purchase South African securities from the South African 
investor.  The SARB did not impose any direct restrictions on foreign investors, but 
required from local institutions to ensure that either their original counterparties or some 
new counterparties remained invested in South African securities for a period of 2 years 
after concluding an asset swap transaction.  This requirement was referred to as 
“maintaining the inward leg”.  The South African investor, as part of its quarterly 
reporting to the SARB, had to confirm that the inward leg was still in place (during the 2-
year period).  
Counterparties. These were investment banks acting as either principals or 
agents, especially for mutual funds and pension funds with a global or emerging market 
mandate and who therefore had an appetite for South African assets. The counterparties 
would agree to buy a basket of securities from the South African investor, usually against 
a fee (although it was anticipated by SARB that the counterparty would also prefer to 
“swap” a basket of foreign securities and from there the term “asset swap”).  
Costs.  Due to the inward leg requirement that aimed to ensure that counterparties 
remained invested in South African securities for a period of 2 years, asset swaps were 
usually done at a discount or for the payment of an arrangement fee payable to the 
counterparty. Initially the discount or some sort of “arrangement fee” was fairly high at 
around 2% – 2.5% of the market value of the basket of South African securities and may 
even have reached 5%. But as more counterparties entered the market and based on the 
size of the basket and the specific securities included in the basket, the discount or fee 
was negotiated down and more or less stabilized at 1%.  Some European investment 
banks even arranged swaps without requiring any fee. This was probably because these 
investment bankers were able to charge their pension fund and mutual fund customers 
double brokerage fees for acquiring South African assets: once for the underlying bond or   15
share purchase, once for the "asset swap".  One reason for the low fees was that these 
were big block transactions which large local institutions were able to put through from 
their own portfolios without affecting market price. Thus, the foreigners obtained the 
assets much cheaper than if they had to use the open market. However, obtaining their 
assets through swap arrangements rather than directly on the market would imply a 
smaller “additional net” benefit for the South African economy and markets from the 
swap arrangements. 
Settlement Procedures.  Settlement initially took place by the South African 
investor’s custodian transferring the assets to the counterparty’s South African custodian 
upon payment of the consideration to the South African investor’s custodian – normal 
DVP rules applied.  Once the consideration was received, the South African investor 
applied to the SARB again for approval to transfer the consideration abroad.  Once this 
was received, usually within a few days, the consideration was transferred abroad.  A 
portfolio of securities had to be acquired within a reasonable period.  Later on the 
requirement that settlement of the consideration had to take place in South Africa was 
removed, as it was evident that the resultant currency transfers affected the exchange rate, 
which was usually to the detriment of the South African investor.  Settlement was then 
effected through the South African investor’s foreign bank account. In fact, the rules 
were tightened in July 1997 and only permitted asset swap transactions that did not 
involve a flow of funds and were structured on the basis of an exchange of cash and/or a 
portfolio of assets.  
Treatment of Foreign Listed Local Equities.  Shares that were dually listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and a foreign exchange were treated as South 
African securities if purchased in the local market and as foreign securities if purchased 
overseas. However, local institutional investors were seeking to diversify their exposure 
away from the JSE and were interested to include in their foreign baskets companies that 
were not heavily exposed to the local economy.  
Collateral Requirements. No specific collateral requirements were applied. 
Global custodians were appointed to facilitate the settlement process but since the “asset 
swaps” were not genuine swap contracts, there were no special collateral rules. The   16
binding jurisdiction when entering into the asset swap was always specified as South 
Africa. 
Regulatory, Accounting and Reporting Requirements. Institutional investors  
had to provide the SARB with a quarterly report detailing their total assets, total foreign 
investments (limited to 15% of total assets) and the asset swaps entered into during the 
previous quarter (later on as things developed, the SARB was willing to approve a 
generic asset swap application in terms of which the South African investor was able to 
pre-apply for block approval in anticipation of future asset swaps).  Apart from the 
requirement to report to the SARB on a quarterly basis and the regular reports that must 
be submitted to leading regulators, there were no other special reporting or accounting 
requirements. No special rules were provided regarding the accounting treatment. The 
foreign assets acquired directly or through the swaps had to be valued according to 
market value or acquisition value, following the same rules that were applied on domestic 
assets for the particular type of institution. The discount or arrangement fee had to be 
expensed in the income statement. In its statistical reports, the SARB did not identify 
separately the holdings of foreign assets of different types of institutional investors.  
Evaluation. The swap arrangements that were used in South Africa were a long 
way from the swap contracts envisaged by Bodie and Merton. They were cumbersome 
and proved difficult to monitor. They were designed to protect the foreign exchange 
reserves but faced serious problems of enforcement. Unlike in the case of swap contracts, 
principal amounts did initially cross the exchanges, giving rise to large foreign exchange 
transactions, although later on asset swap transactions were not allowed to involve a flow 
of principals across the exchanges. Protection of principal from expropriation risk was 
not ensured and the swap business could not itself be available for subsequent trading on 
the market. These swap arrangements did not lend themselves to a development of swap 
market liquidity.   
The foreign investors were supposed to inform the South African institution 
whenever they were selling the assets they had acquired as part of the "asset swap".  But 
foreign institutions were not in practice bound by the SARB rules in this regard and were 
unlikely to have complied with this requirement. When the rand came under pressure, it   17
is likely that most, if not all, of the asset swap counterparties proceeded to sell their South 
African assets. Since nobody was officially informed of this, the South African 
institutions were not asked to repatriate their leg of the deal nor were they obliged to find 
new counterparties.  SARB inspectors undertook ad hoc spot checks on some of the 
larger local investors, but did not verify on a systematic basis that the foreign 
counterparties continued to be invested in South African securities.  Some commentators 
have argued that it would have been better to allow the South African institutions to 
diversify internationally gradually and directly and without the artificial business of 
bringing in foreign counterparties which de facto became hot money that rushed for the 
exit when conditions deteriorated.  
Despite these misgivings and cumbersome operational characteristics, the swap 
arrangements allowed institutional investors to achieve a 15% level of international 
diversification. Institutional investors continued to be allowed to invest overseas up to 
10% of future net inflow but the potential impact of this rule was constrained by the 
overall limit of 15% of total assets, which most institutions had already reached.  
The authorities failed to authorize a continuation of swap arrangements for a total 
of, say, 10% of assets, allowing a combined total diversification of 25% of assets (15% 
outright and 10% through swaps). Given the cumbersome nature of the arrangements 
then in use, they could have encouraged use of proper swap contracts in extending the 
facility. The decision not to extend the facility and not to use proper swaps is puzzling 
because there are at least 40 South African companies that are included in the MSCI 
Emerging Markets Free Index, while 68 out of 74 US emerging market mutual funds 
invest in South African firms (Aggarwal et al 2003). There is also a large number of 
European mutual funds that invest in South African securities. Thus, demand for properly 
designed swap contracts would most likely have been forthcoming. 
The South African experience also underscores the importance of an effective 
regulatory framework, especially with regard to reporting and accounting requirements. 
Given the cumbersome nature of the swap arrangements, the reporting requirements were 
difficult to monitor. However, the system was adapted over time and block approval   18
arrangements were introduced. Use of proper swap contracts would have made both 
reporting requirements and verification of compliance much easier. 
The swap arrangements did not have any implications for accounting records 
since local institutional investors exchanged their domestic assets for foreign ones and 
had to value the latter according to prevailing valuation rules. The inward leg requirement 
did not appear on their balance sheet. If proper swap contracts were to be used, there 
would be a need for a more specified accounting treatment. The local institutions would 
continue to own the “swapped” domestic assets. In accounting terms, these could be 
reported with other domestic assets, with a footnote noting the fact that they have been 
swapped and their value on the basis of foreign market values. Alternatively, swapped 
assets could be shown separately at their foreign market value. The income statement 
would have to indicate the net gain or loss arising from the swap. 
For statistical purposes, the volume of swapped assets should be reported 
separately as should any holdings of foreign assets.  In this sense, the SARB practice of 
including foreign assets with other assets in the case of insurance companies and with 
domestic equities or bonds in the case of pension funds has failed to reveal valuable 
information. 
Proper swaps are over-the-counter (OTC) instruments that are traded outside 
organized exchanges. This presents advantages as well as disadvantages. On the one 
hand, they are subject to less regulation with regard to capital requirements, conduct 
rules, and loss sharing arrangements in case of default and enjoy considerable flexibility 
in customization. But, on the other hand, they suffer from greater exposure to 
counterparty risk and require marked-to-market valuation with effective monitoring and 
adequate collateralization. These disadvantages can be greatly reduced by use of 
counterparties with top level credentials and reliance on standardized contracts subject to 
well established enforcement procedures (Ladekarl and Svennesen 1999, Draghi, 
Giavazzi and Merton 2003).   19
VI.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Pension funds and other institutional investors in developing countries are 
constrained in achieving broad international diversification by strict controls on foreign 
investments. These controls are motivated by the desire to prevent capital flight and 
preserve scarce foreign exchange reserves. It is also sometimes argued that requiring 
pension funds and other institutional investors to invest locally would stimulate the 
development of the local capital markets.  
International asset swaps can be used to achieve international diversification 
while averting capital flight and stimulating local capital market development. As argued 
by Bodie and Merton (2002), the main benefits of asset swaps would come from a 
significant improvement in the efficient portfolio frontier facing domestic institutional 
investors.  The global equity markets can be used to achieve better diversification and the 
global fixed-income markets can be used to achieve better hedging opportunities. 
Faced with the challenge of allowing their institutional investors to attain greater 
international diversification when foreign exchange reserves are at a particularly low 
level, the South African authorities permitted local institutions to “obtain foreign 
investments by way of swap arrangements”. These turned out to be rather cumbersome 
and difficult to enforce, but even so they achieved their basic objective of greater 
diversification without capital flight. 
However, the asset swap mechanism used in South Africa deviated considerably 
from the optimal features of swap contracts that have been underscored by Bodie and 
Merton. The main benefits of properly designed swap contracts are the ease of 
transactions, the avoidance of large foreign exchange transactions, the minimization of 
brokerage and other transaction costs, and the protection from expropriation and market 
manipulation  risks. 
Given the presence of 40 South African firms in the MSCI Emerging Markets 
Free Index (MSCI EMFI) and the existence of a large number of pension and mutual 
funds from Europe and North America with a strong interest to invest in South African   20
securities, the failure to use properly designed swap contracts is puzzling. Demand for 
such contracts would most likely have been forthcoming
9. 
There is some concern about regulatory, accounting and reporting issues. 
However, the experience of South Africa has shown that even with the more cumbersome 
arrangements used there, these issues have not presented a major problem. Ideally, asset 
swaps should be valued at market prices, they should be clearly indicated in the balance 
sheets of institutional investors, and reported separately in official statistics. Asset swaps 
are a second best compared to a complete lifting of exchange restrictions but they have a 
role to play even in the absence of exchange controls. 
Policy makers in developing countries that would like to encourage their 
institutional investors to undertake (or expand) international diversification of their assets 
would need to take the following steps: 
•  First, the authorities should formally allow pension funds and other 
institutional investors to engage in international asset swaps. The 
authorization should specify an upper limit in relation to total assets and to net 
inflow over the preceding calendar year (15% of assets and 10% of net inflow 
would seem reasonable targets). 
•  Second, the authorities would need to specify the criteria of eligible 
counterparties, in terms of financial standing and experience, or even make up 
a list of such counterparties, drawn from the ranks of global investment banks 
with a good record of specialization and performance in this area. Requests 
for Proposals could be issued to elicit interest by such global investment banks 
and identify institutions that were willing to compete in the market. 
•  Third, the types of permitted asset swaps should be specified.  Ideally, swaps 
involving market indices of liquid instruments would be recommended, 
including a global index plus a few regional ones. The maturity of asset swaps 
should be specified, starting with a minimum 2-year term and extending over 
time to up to 10 years. 
                                                 
9   Several other countries around the world meet criteria similar to South Africa.  As of February 2002, 
Mexico had 22 firms in the MSCI EMFI, while 89 US emerging market mutual funds invested in Mexican 
firms. Brazil had 34 firms and also 89 mutual funds; Chile 22 firms and 69 mutual funds; Argentina 13 
firms and 41 mutual funds; China 41 firms and 83 mutual funds; India 58 firms and 87 mutual funds; and 
Korea 76 firms and 98 mutual funds (Aggarwal et al 2003).   21
•  Fourth, accounting and valuation rules should be specified. Ideally, swap 
contracts should be marked-to-market on a daily basis, even if settlement of 
net gains and losses is effected on a quarterly or half-yearly basis. Settlement 
should be effected at least half-yearly. Local institutions should be required to 
monitor the credit risk of their counterparties. Provisions could be included 
requiring settlement on a more frequent basis if the total amount of credit risk 
exceeds a specified threshold. 
•  Fifth, special collateral and custodian provisions should be established. The 
use of global custodians of high standing and the maintenance of adequate and 
appropriate collateral should be required.  In special cases, the central bank 
could be authorized to act as the custodian, calculating market values and 
credit risk, holding collateral and even acting as a center point for all 
transactions until local institutions develop the required expertise to handle 
such transactions on their own.  
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Annex I 
Growth and Structure of Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors, and especially the contractual savings sector, are very well 
developed in South Africa. The net assets of retirement funds and long-term insurers, 
after eliminating double counting, amounted in 2001 to ZAR 1.39 trillion or 142% of 
GDP (See Annex I). This was up from 119% of GDP in 1995. Adding the assets of unit 
trusts brings the total for institutional investors to ZAR 1.56 trillion in 2001, equivalent to 
159% of GDP. Short-term insurers, which are not classified as institutional investors in 
South Africa, had assets of an additional 45 billion rand (4.6% of GDP).  Only four other 
countries in the world (the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) have institutional investors that have more assets in relation to GDP than 
South Africa. The net flow into contractual savings (pension funds and long-term 
insurers), taking into account contributions and premiums as well as investment income 
and after allowing for benefit outlays, administrative expenses and tax payments, 
amounted to an impressive 18% of GDP in 2001. 
Table I.1: Institutional Structure 
% of GDP  1995 1998  2001 
Official Pension Funds  22.4 25.2  29.3 
Self-Administered Private Pension Funds (SAPF)  31.6 31.5  39.4 
Underwritten Private Pension Funds  34.2 30.2  35.2 
Total Pension Funds  88.1 86.9  104.0 
     
Long-Term Insurers (LTIs)  74.5 68.6  83.9 
Less Underwritten Pension Funds  34.2 30.2  35.2 
Less Insurance Policies of SAPF  9.3 9.3  11.0 
Net Assets of LTIs  31.0 29.1  37.6 
     
Total Pension Funds and LTIs  119.1 116.1  141.6 
Unit Trusts  6.2 9.8  17.1 
Total Institutional Investors  125.3 125.9  158.7 
Short-Term Insurers  5.9 5.6  4.6 
Grand Total  131.2 131.5  163.3 
    
Grand Total (billion ZAR)  719.18 971.45  1605.03 
Source: SA Reserve Bank   23
The institutional investor sector is dominated by long-term insurers if one focuses 
on the type of institutions that act as administrators and asset managers, but by retirement 
schemes if one focuses on the type of products that predominate. This reflects the 
extensive overlap that exists between retirement funds and long-term insurers. Another 
significant source of overlap exists between long-term institutions and unit trusts, but 
available statistics do not allow a separate estimation of the investments of pension funds 
and long-term insurers in unit trusts. 
Both retirement funds and long-term insurers have benefited enormously from a 
very favorable tax treatment. Annual contributions to approved retirement schemes are 
deductible from taxable income, while the investment income of these institutions also 
benefits from favorable tax treatment. The tax incentives have additional significance in 
South Africa because of its relatively high marginal rates of personal income taxation.  
The achievement of high rates of return relative to those available on bank 
deposits and the impressive record of innovation have also been important factors behind 
the growth of contractual savings.  South African insurance companies claim to have 
invented and popularized unit-linked life and annuity policies (known as variable policies 
in the US).
10  More recently, insurance companies have innovated with policies linked to 
serious illnesses.  Competition is very intense, despite the concentrated structure of the 
industry.  Premiums are regularly adjusted in response to changing market conditions on 
investment yields and competitive offerings.  
The combined annual flow of contractual savings into retirement funds and life 
insurance companies amounted to just over ZAR 200 billion or 20.4% of GDP in 2001, 
underscoring the importance of the sector as a mobilizer of long-term savings. Because of 
the large size of their assets, pension funds and long-term insurers generate huge 
investment income. In 2001 this was slightly higher than the annual inflow from 
contributions.
11 On the other hand, the maturity of the schemes implies substantial annual 
                                                 
10 There may be some validity to this claim, at least with regard to the popularization of these policies. The 
first insurance executives, who promoted unit-linked policies in London in the late 1960s, came from South 
Africa. On the other hand, officials of TIAA-CREF are known to have promoted the use of variable annuity 
policies since the early 1950s. 
11 The estimate for investment income includes unrealized capital gains. The level of investment income 
fluctuates considerably from year to year, depending on the performance of equity and bond markets.   24
payments for benefits, including surrenders of life policies, lump sum payments on 
retirement, and regular payments from annuity policies and pension schemes.  The total 
of these outflows amounted to ZAR 194 billion in 2001 or 19.7% of GDP. Allowing for 
administrative expenses and tax payments, the net inflow of funds into long-term insurers 
and pension funds equaled ZAR 181 billion or 18% of GDP.
12 The dominant role played 
by insurance companies is underscored in this table. 
Table I.2: Annual Flows of Pension Funds and Long-Term Insurers, 2001 
%  of  GDP  A B C D 
Official  Pension  Funds  1.54 1.35 3.77 3.86 
Self-Administered Private Pension Funds (SAPF)  2.33  3.18  3.74  2.54 
Long-Term  Insurers  (LTIs)  16.55 15.15 13.01 12.01 
Total  20.42 19.69 20.53 18.41 
Notes: A: Contributions and Premiums; B: Benefits; C: Investment Income; 
D: Net Flows 
Source: SA Reserve Bank 
Retirement Funds.  Three major trends characterized the evolution of pension 
funds in the last decade or so. The first has been the very large and rapid increase in the 
assets of official pension funds. From a very low level in the 1980s, official pension 
funds have grown to represent nearly 30% of the pension fund sector. Currently, the 
assets of the retirement fund sector are divided into three more or less equal parts: those 
administered by the Public Investment Commissioner; those administered by insurance 
companies; and those managed by self-administered funds.  
Concentration in the retirement fund sector is quite high. The 10 largest pension 
funds, out of a total number of well over 15,000 schemes, account for nearly half the total 
assets of retirement funds. Nearly 90% of all retirement schemes are insured and 
administered by long-term insurers. Total membership of retirement schemes is estimated 
at over 10 million active members
13 and close to 2 million pensioners.   
In addition to the very rapid buildup of the assets of the official funds, another 
major trend has been the conversion of most retirement funds from defined benefit (DB) 
                                                 
12 Readily available data, i.e. those included in the statistical bulletin of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, 
do not identify separately administrative expenses and tax payments. In general, operating costs of 
employer schemes are low. They are estimated at 6% of annual contributions or 0.30% of average assets. 
Long-term insurers incur higher costs, mainly because of their marketing effort.  
13 Allowing for extensive double counting due to participation in multiple schemes, the true level of active 
membership may be closer to between 7 and 8 million workers.   25
to defined contribution (DC) plans. It is estimated that 90% of members and 60% of 
assets of self-administered funds are now covered by DC plans. However, the funds for 
civil servants as well as some large self-administered funds continue to operate DB plans. 
Some retirement funds have introduced reasonable worker choice in the direction 
of investments in DC plans, a pattern that is already quite prevalent in the United States 
and Australia. Some of the available investment funds offer market-related returns, where 
the investment risk is assumed by employees, while others offer “protected” returns, 
where employees benefit from protection against downside risk but have less than full 
participation in the upside potential. Insurance companies have long operated similar 
schemes, offering either market linked products or “smoothed bonus” products. 
The conversion process has been encouraged by the decision of some funds to 
distribute the existing large surplus, occasionally as high as 40%, to all active workers in 
proportion to their accumulated actuarial balance in the fund. In several cases, fund 
trustees or the sponsoring employers have sought to liquidate pension funds and transfer 
any surplus back to the employers. The distribution of pension surpluses is now regulated 
by an amendment to pension fund legislation.  
Retirement funds provide both lump sum benefits and regular pensions. They are 
currently mostly well funded and do not seem to be exposed to huge financial risks. 
However, care is required to prevent a serious mismatch of assets and liabilities from 
arising and thus to avoid exposure to a major reinvestment risk, while diversification of 
country risk has been a major challenge in view of the continuing imposition of exchange 
controls on capital movements.  
Long-term Insurers.  Long-term insurers play a leading part in the system. They 
control 60% of the total assets of long-term institutions and 50% of the total assets of all 
institutional investors. Group pension business and individual retirement annuities 
account for 55% of total business. Concentration in the sector is very high. The two 
largest companies, which were demutualized in the late 1990s, control well over 60% of 
the market, while the largest five have over 90% of total assets.  
Their annual premiums from all types of business, group pensions as well as 
individual life and annuity business, amounted in 2001 to 15.2% of GDP according to   26
statistics published by Sigma.
14 This is by far the highest in the world. The next highest 
level is recorded in the UK with 10.7%, while Japan, South Korea and Switzerland 
hovered between 8% and 9% of GDP. Interestingly enough, in the US and Canada the 
corresponding levels were respectively 4.4% and 3% (Sigma 2002). 
Long-term insurers may be divided into two main groups: risk insurers, which 
mainly offer protection policies to low-income groups (term life and disability insurance 
and/or funeral expenses) and investment insurers, which emphasize the investment part of 
the business. The former are dominated by black-owned or managed companies, such as 
African Life, that cater to the needs of low income groups and often engage in what 
might be termed “micro insurance”. The latter are further subdivided into companies that 
offer market-linked products (such as Liberty, which reportedly has over 70% of its 
policy liabilities in market-linked products) and more traditional insurers, where 
smoothed-bonus (profit participating) policies account for the majority of business (such 
as Old Mutual and Sanlam Life). Investment insurers are increasingly seen as collective 
investment institutions and their performance is compared, often unfavorably, with that 
of unit trusts and other asset management companies. 
The life insurance industry has experienced some difficulties in recent years. 
Premium growth has slowed down, while investment returns have suffered sharp 
fluctuations. In addition, both operating expenses and lapse and surrender ratios have 
been rising. The growth in benefits has outstripped the growth in premium income. 
Short-term Insurers. The non-life, short-term business, sector is less well 
developed than the life sector.  The total premiums of short-term insurers amounted in 
2001 to 2.8% of GDP
15 and total assets to nearly 5% of GDP (Table 1).  Over 40% of 
premiums are generated in motor insurance. Underwriting results experience the same 
cyclicality as in most countries with advanced insurance sectors. Concentration in the 
non-life sector is not as high as in life business. The three largest companies account for 
                                                 
14 The Sigma estimate is somewhat lower than the figure, reported in Table 2, that is derived from the 
Reserve Bank bulletin. However, differences of this order of magnitude are not uncommon. 
15 This level is comparable to that of most OECD countries, apart from a few very advanced countries, such 
as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, where the level of 
non-life premiums ranges between 3 and 4.5% of GDP (Sigma 2002)     27
32% of annual premiums. However, concentration is significantly higher than in most 
advanced OECD countries. 
The main structural issue facing the non-life insurance sector is the deterioration 
in underwriting results that reflects growing competition from captive companies and 
high losses in the fire and motor business, partly as a result of growing crime, theft and 
road accidents.  
Unit Trusts.  Unit trusts and other collective investment institutions are less well 
developed than other institutional investors but, as in most countries around the world, 
they grew very rapidly during the 1990s (Fernando et al 2003). Their total assets 
amounted in 2001 to 17% of GDP, a level that was almost double that of 1998 and more 
than triple that of 1995 (Table 1). Unit trusts have over 3 million accounts but, because of 
extensive multiple account holding, the number of unit trust investors is likely to be much 
smaller. 
Equities represent 53% of total assets with money market instruments accounting 
for 30% and public sector securities for 15%. The preference for equity funds reflects the 
impact of taxation as dividend income and capital gains are free from tax, but interest and 
rental income are taxed. Money market, index tracking, and funds of funds were only 
introduced in second half of the 1990s. The last two types still account for a very small 
proportion of total assets, but money market funds have experienced rapid growth. 
International funds have also expanded very fast. 
Policy Challenges and Issues.  Because of its large size and the role it is 
expected to play in meeting the long-term financial and retirement needs of a majority of 
South African households, the institutional investor sector is faced with several important 
challenges and policy issues. Considerable concern is frequently expressed about the 
macroeconomic implications of the large size of contractual savings and their impact on 
the rate of saving and economic growth as well as on the financing of small firms.  
Criticisms often include allegations that institutional investors engage in a "paper chase" 
that inflates stock market prices without any beneficial effects for the broader economy. 
A related issue concerns the role that institutional investors can play in facilitating 
the transition to a more integrated society, following the momentous political   28
transformation of the mid-1990s.  The sector has felt a strong pressure to adopt an active 
stance on facilitating the transition, especially in securing finance for black entrepreneurs 
and for capital-intensive initiatives, such as housing, schools and infrastructure projects. 
There has also been pressure for affirmative action both in recruitment of staff and in the 
provision of financial services.
16   
A more important issue that is linked to the primary objective of retirement 
schemes relates to the adequacy of their funding levels and the security of promised 
benefits. South African pension funds and long-term insurers generally enjoy strong 
financial positions with high funding levels and solvency margins.  However, the sector 
has historically been prevented by the imposition of exchange controls from diversifying 
internationally and reducing its exposure to country risk.  Moreover, because leading 
institutional investors bought out some of the stakes of departing foreign investors during 
the period of sanctions, their exposure to domestic industrial and commercial groups 
increased considerably in the 1980s.  Exposure to inflated stock market prices could 
imply an overstatement of funding levels. A collapse, or even high volatility, of stock 
market prices could have undesirable implications for the ability of pension schemes to 
meet promised benefits.  The close links between leading insurance companies and 
industrial and commercial groups also raise issues regarding the effectiveness and 
efficiency of corporate governance structures in South Africa. 
Various structural changes in recent years, such as the unbundling of complex 
pyramidal holding structures and the gradual permission to invest in overseas assets, have 
alleviated the exposure of institutional investors to an over-concentration in country risk 
and to weak corporate governance structures. However, a greater diversification of risk 
assets as well as greater insulation from weak corporate governance structures is still 
required. A particular challenge is the achievement of greater country risk diversification 
in the context of the imposition of exchange controls on capital movements that may be 
justified for other reasons.
                                                 
16 For a brief early discussion of these issues, see Vittas (1995). See also some of the studies referred in that 




Before 1989 the asset allocation policies of institutional investors were shaped by 
the use of prescribed asset ratios that favored public sector securities and by the 
imposition of exchange controls that prevented investments in overseas assets. Insurance 
companies and pension funds were required until 1989 to place 53% of their untaxed 
liabilities and 33% of their taxed liabilities into fixed-interest-bearing public sector 
securities.  The real return on those securities was substantially lower than that on listed 
equities.  Although it was positive in real terms in the 1960s, it turned negative in the 
1970s and 1980s when inflation accelerated to double digits.   
Data contained in the Mouton Report (Mouton Committee 1992) show that the 
average nominal return on equities was 11.3% in the 1960s against 4.9% for prescribed 
assets and 3% for the inflation rate.  Thus, prescribed investments earned a positive real 
return of 1.8%, but under-performed equities by 6.1%.  In the 1970s, the nominal return 
on equities increased to 24.5%, but the return on prescribed assets rose to only 7.3% 
against an inflation rate of 11.3%, resulting in a negative real return of 3.6% and in a 
foregone income loss of no less than 16%.  In the 1980s, the nominal return on equities 
fell to 20.1%, while the return on prescribed assets rose to 13.5%.  However, as inflation 
accelerated further to 14.5%, prescribed assets continued to earn a negative real return of 
0.9%. The foregone income loss was much reduced compared to the disastrous 1970s but 
still equaled 5.8%. 
Estimates contained in the Jacobs report (Jacobs Committee 1992) show that life 
insurance companies held on average 29% of their assets in prescribed investments in the 
1970s and 1980s so that the "wealth tax" on their assets, based on their negative returns, 
ranged from 1% in the 1970s to 0.3% in the 1980s.  Pension funds invested 50% of their 
assets in prescribed investments in the 1970s and thus suffered a "wealth tax" equal to 
1.8% per year, while in the 1980s their prescribed investments declined to 44% of their 
total assets and their "wealth" tax fell to 0.4% per year.  On the basis of foregone income,   30
i.e. in relation to the returns they could have achieved by investing in equities, the 
"wealth tax" would have been much greater.  For life insurers, it would have amounted to 
4.5% in the 1970s and 1.7% in the 1980s and for pension funds to 7.8% and 2.6% 
respectively.  Clearly, the use of prescribed assets had an adverse impact on the returns of 
insurance companies and pension funds.  Dissatisfaction with their use, which had 
effectively transformed contractual savings into a captive source of government funding, 
led to their removal in 1989. 
Following the abolition of prescribed asset ratios, pension funds and insurance 
companies lowered their holdings of public sector securities and increased their 
investments in corporate equities. By 1995, self-administered pension funds held 17% of 
their assets in public sector securities and 30% in equities, while they also placed another 
30% with long-term insurers.  Life insurance companies allocated 18% in public sector 
securities and no less than 56% in equities. Official pension funds continued to invest 
heavily in public sector securities, which represented 73% of their assets. Short-term 
insurers allocated 41% in equities, 18% in public sector securities and 22% in liquid 
assets.  Finally, unit trusts placed 75% in equities, 11% in government bonds, and 13% in 
liquid assets (Table 3). 
Table II.1: Asset Allocation, 1995 
(% of total)  Official  Self-Admin LTI  STI  UT  Total 
Public  Sector  Claims  73.19 16.50 18.00 17.68 10.63  27.96 
Private Sector Bonds & Loans  5.17  2.57  6.90  8.50  0.79  5.84 
Equities  12.14 29.66 55.60 40.91 74.51  46.14 
Liquid Assets  4.56  12.92  7.52  21.76  13.07  9.76 
Property  1.66 5.59 8.29 1.72    6.41 
Other  Assets  3.28 3.15 3.69 9.42    3.89 
Funds with Insurers    29.60         
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00 
Source: SA Reserve Bank 
Significant changes in asset allocation occurred between 1995 and 2001. The 
holdings of public sector securities of official pension funds fell dramatically to 48% of 
their total assets with corporate equities registering a large increase to 36% (up from 12% 
in 1995). Self-administered pension funds also raised their holdings of equities to 41% 
while, in sharp contrast, long-term insurers reduced their equity allocations to 46%. The 
category “other assets” of long-term insurers increased from 4% to 17%, while that of   31
short-term insurers rose from 9% to 15%. Investments in property of all types of 
institutional investors declined between 1995 and 2001. Unit trusts, reflecting the 
emergence of money market mutual funds, increased their liquid assets to 30%, while 
reducing their equity holdings to 53%.  
Overall, institutional investors invested in 2001 47% of their assets in corporate 
equities, 20% in public sector securities, 9% in private sector debt instruments (corporate 
and mortgage bonds as well as various types of direct loans), 11% in liquid assets, 11% in 
other assets, and 3% in property. In the statistics published by the Reserve Bank  holdings 
of foreign assets are not separately identified. In the case of pension funds, they are 
shown together with the corresponding domestic assets, while in the case of insurance 
companies they are classified with other assets. 
Table II.2: Asset Allocation, 2001 
(% of total)  Official  Self-Admin LTI  STI  UT  Total 
Public  Sector  Claims  48.02 10.80 13.36 12.46 15.03  20.02 
Private Sector Bonds & Loans  8.70  6.92  10.13  4.05  1,70  8.73 
Equities  36.29 40.54 46.22 37.77 52.60  46.62 
Liquid  Assets  4.69 7.07 8.05  29.03  29.85  10.62 
Property  0.48 2.90 5.09 1.26    3.44 
Other Assets  1.81  3.83  17.14  15.42    10.57 
Funds with Insurers    27.94         
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00 
Source: SA Reserve Bank 
Since 1995 institutional investors have been allowed to invest in overseas assets, 
either directly or by way of swap arrangements. Most pension funds and long-term 
insurance companies proceeded to make full use of the permitted direct and indirect 
allocations in overseas assets, thus demonstrating that they were fully aware of the need 
to achieve a more optimal diversification of their risks.  
An interesting feature of the South African financial landscape is the large role 
played by major institutional investors, not only in corporate governance but also in 
direct strategic ownership of industrial and commercial groups. The large insurance 
companies own large stakes in numerous industrial and commercial companies as well as 
controlling stakes in the major South African banks and building societies. The insurance 
groups also hold many strategic investments in individual companies, i.e. investments 
that exceed 20% of the capital of the invested company.  In the case of Sanlam, these   32
have resulted from the traditional policy objective of encouraging the development of 
Afrikaner industry. In the case of Old Mutual, the strategic holdings are not linked to a 
specific active policy objective, although the group claims that its strategic holdings 
broadly earn the same kind of returns as its portfolio holdings. 
The role of the two insurance groups is overshadowed only by the greater 
involvement in corporate governance of nonfinancial conglomerates, such as Anglo-
American and De Beers.  These mainly originate from the mining sector and have 
acquired their extensive interests in industrial and commercial companies in the process 
of diversification and as a result of government policies pursued over the past forty years 
or so.  It is estimated that, together with the two insurance groups, four or five South 
African conglomerates are in direct or indirect, but effective, control of 80% of corporate 
assets
17. 
South African groups started to implement a policy of "unbundling" their 
controlling interests in the mid-1990s. These included both a disposal of shares by some 
of the secondary holding companies in the complex pyramidal structures that had 
previously been created and the closing down of some “intermediate level” holding 
companies.  In this way, the groups gave up legal majority control in industrial 
companies, although they still retained effective management control through their large 
strategic holdings.  The "unbundling" has been motivated by the desire to raise market 
values by eliminating the secondary holding companies (which traded at a discount to net 
asset value) and relying on the higher rating of "unbundled" companies. However, 
strategic holdings continue to be extensive and raise several policy issues concerning 
conflicts of interest and significant exposure to corporate risk. 
                                                 
17  Reported in Gerson (1992b).   33
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